Phoenix is a Rowhammer variant against DDR5 DRAM that bypasses on-die mitigations by exploiting timing blind spots in Target Row Refresh (TRR) and using long hammering sequences that remain synchronized with refresh commands via a self-correcting refresh synchronization mechanism. The researchers demonstrated exploitable bit flips on SK Hynix DDR5 DIMMs and end-to-end attacks including arbitrary read/write via PTE corruption, RSA key leakage, and local privilege escalation.
Rowhammer (DRAM disturbance attack)
TRR implementations on the affected SK Hynix DDR5 modules exhibit non-uniform sampling across refresh intervals. Attackers can craft hammer patterns that target the lightly-sampled or unsampled tREFI intervals so TRR fails to refresh victim rows in time.
sudo
binary modification → local root escalation (~33% of DIMMs)Successful exploitation can lead to privilege escalation, secret extraction (SSH keys), and cross-VM compromise in multi-tenant environments.
CVSS v3.1 (est.): 8.8 (High)
Vector | Value |
---|---|
Attack Vector | Local |
Attack Complexity | High |
Privileges Required | Low |
User Interaction | None |
15 SK Hynix DDR5 DIMMs (2021–2024) — all tested modules vulnerable to at least one pattern. ODECC does not prevent exploitation.
ETH Zurich published a PoC on GitHub for controlled testing (AMD Zen 4). Defensive signals to monitor:
06 Jun 2025 — Coordinated disclosure initiated
12 Sep 2025 — Vendor notified (BIOS update availability)
15 Sep 2025 — Embargo lifted
28 Sep 2025 — Advisory published
• ETH Zurich COMSEC Phoenix project page
• Phoenix GitHub repository (POC + artifacts)
• Google Security Blog summary
• CVE-2025-6202
Organizations using DDR5 systems with SK Hynix DIMMs should immediately apply vendor BIOS/firmware updates and evaluate increasing DRAM refresh rates until hardware fixes or new DRAM revisions become available.
Acknowledgments: ETH Zurich Computer Security Group (COMSEC) and Google Security. Disclosure coordination: Swiss NCSC.